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Abstract
Global health networks—webs of individuals and organizations linked by a shared concern for a particular 
condition—have proliferated over the past quarter century. In a recent editorial in this journal, I presented 
evidence that their effectiveness in addressing four challenges—problem definition, positioning, coalition-
building and governance—shapes their ability to influence policy. The editorial prompted five thoughtful 
commentaries that reflected on these and other challenges.
In this follow-up editorial, I build on the commentaries to suggest ways of advancing research on global health 
networks. I argue that investigators would do well to consider three social theory-influenced global governance 
debates pertaining to agency—the capacity of individuals and organizations to act autonomously amidst 
structural constraints. The three debates concern the relationship between agency and structure, the power 
of ideas vis-à-vis interests and material capabilities, and the level of influence of non-state actors in a global 
governance system that most scholars identify as state-dominated. Drawing on these debates, I argue that rather 
than presume global health network influence, we need to find more robust ways to investigate their effects. I 
argue also that rather than juxtapose agency and structure, ideas and interests and non-state and state power, it 
would be more productive to consider the ways in which these elements are intertwined.
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Introduction
Over the past quarter century global health networks—webs 
of individuals and organizations linked by a shared concern 
for a particular condition—have proliferated. In a recent 
editorial in this journal,1 drawing on case studies of eight 
global health networks[1], I identified four challenges that 
these networks commonly face. I presented evidence that 
network effectiveness in addressing these challenges shapes 
their capacity to influence policy. The editorial prompted 
five thoughtful commentaries that reflected on these four 
challenges, on other factors potentially influencing global 
health networks, and on strategies to augment network 
effectiveness.2-6 The challenges are:
1.	 Problem definition: generating internal consensus on the 
nature of the problem and solutions
2.	 Positioning: portraying the issue in ways that inspire 
external audiences to act
3.	 Coalition-building: forging alliances with actors beyond 
those in the health sector
4.	 Governance: establishing suitable institutions to facilitate 
collective action.
In this follow-up editorial, I build on the insights of the 
commentaries, and connect the commentaries and original 
editorial to three social theory-influenced global governance 
debates concerning agency—the capacity of individuals 
and organizations to act autonomously amidst structural 
constraints. Constructivists—scholars who understand much 
of reality to be socially constructed—have played a large role 
in bringing these debates into the scholarly field of global 
governance. The three debates pertain to the relationship 
between agency and structure, the power of ideas vis-à-vis 
interests and material capabilities, and the level of influence 
of non-state actors in a global governance system that most 
scholars identify as state-dominated. The commentaries 
and my original editorial present explicit evidence or make 
implicit assumptions affirming the power of agency, ideas and 
non-state actors.
I argue that scholars investigating global health networks 
would do well to reference these debates as a means of 
advancing inquiry on global health network effects and 
contributing to theory development on the nature of agency in 
global governance. I make three primary points in this regard. 
First, rather than presume global health network influence, 
we ought to find more robust ways to investigate whether 
they have significant effects on policy and population health, 
and if so under what circumstances. Second, global health 
network initiatives are examples of a larger phenomenon—
attempts by transnationally-linked actors to induce normative 
change in the global system—and their study potentially can 
contribute to theory development on this subject. Third, as 
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we investigate global health networks and their effects, rather 
than juxtaposing structure and agency, interests and ideas, 
and state and non-state power, it would be more productive 
to consider the ways in which these elements are intertwined.
Structure and Agency
At the heart of the structure-agency debate in global governance 
is the extent to which individuals and organizations can alter 
the world in the face of durable social arrangements that 
may constrain change (that is, structural barriers). Scholars 
working in a constructivist tradition7-11 have drawn on social 
theory12-15 to inject structure-agency debates into the global 
governance field. 
Constructivists disagree on the power of agency.16 Sociological 
institutionalists emphasize structural influence and downplay 
agency.9 They note the remarkable similarity in the 
composition and aspirations of states that, they argue, cannot 
be explained without appeal to the power of a world culture, 
one that privileges rights and modernity. This world culture 
is a homogenizing force, one that constrains agents who are 
engaged less in careful deliberation than in the somewhat 
mindless enactment of received scripts. To illustrate this 
power of a world culture, Meyer and colleagues imagine that 
(pp. 145-6)9:
“If an unknown society were “discovered” on a previously 
unknown island, it is clear that many changes would 
occur. A government would soon form, looking 
something like a modern state…. Official recognition 
by other states and admission to the United Nations 
would ensue.... Its people would be formally reorganized 
as citizens with many familiar rights…. Standard forms 
of discrimination, especially ethnic and gender based, 
would be discovered and decried. The population would 
be counted and classified in ways specified by world 
census models.”
Agentic-oriented constructivists, while recognizing the 
power of structure, criticize the mechanistic thrust of 
sociological institutionalism, seeing contingency in the world 
and the role of human consciousness and deliberation in 
change. For instance, Finnemore and Sikkink10 point to the 
example of Henry Dunant, who inspired the formation of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross in 1863 and helped 
to alter the rules of warfare to include, among other norms, 
the neutrality of non-combatants. Another example they 
mention are women’s rights advocates who in 1904 established 
the International Women’s Suffrage Association, marking 
the launch of an international campaign that resulted in the 
widespread adoption of voting rights for women. Sikkink,11 
concerned about what she understands to be the dominance 
of structural perspectives in constructivism, has called for an 
‘agentic constructivism,’ one that is (p. 8):
“…concerned with the micro-foundations of creating 
and constituting new actors and new conditions of 
possibilities—where new actors take on and challenge (and 
sometimes change) existing logics of appropriateness…. 
These actors don’t mindlessly ‘enact’ or ‘perform’ scripts, 
but question them.”
Most individuals and organizations that comprise global 
health networks, presumably, believe in the power of agency, 
expecting through their work to reduce levels of morbidity 
and mortality that arise from the conditions that concern 
them. A challenge to this perspective is the idea that global 
health networks are epiphenomenal—a product of the 
existence of health conditions but having no sizeable impact 
on their severity or on global and national efforts to address 
them. A variant of this argument is that their members are not 
exercising agency so much as enacting scripts produced by the 
homogenizing, modernistic world culture that sociological 
institutionalists claim exists. 
The original editorial and commentaries, although cognizant 
of structural influence, recognize the power of agency and 
seem to reject a position that structure is overwhelmingly 
constraining and that networks are epiphenomenal (italics 
added):
“Problem and solution definition and external 
positioning…can have an important influence on…public 
health programs” (p. 2).4
“The way networks manage these four challenges has 
substantial influence on the likelihood that they achieve 
their objectives” (p. 188).1
“[The NCD Alliance] is a classic example of a successful 
network, bringing coherence and strength to a formerly 
diffuse community” (p. 3).2
Empirical research has yet to settle the question of the 
epiphenomenal nature of networks or the size of network 
effects, however. Moreover, detecting network effects is a 
difficult research challenge, as colleagues and I discovered 
as we undertook case studies of networks addressing alcohol 
harm, tobacco control, tuberculosis, pneumonia, maternal 
survival, newborn survival, surgical conditions and early 
childhood development.17-24 The further one moves down the 
policy funnel—from global resolutions to national uptake to 
population health—the more difficult it becomes to assess 
network effects, since the number of confounding factors 
multiplies.25
While many network members and published reports make 
strong assertions about network efficacy, social scientists 
must stand back from these claims and find robust means of 
assessing effects. One strategy is to consider counterfactuals: 
in the absence of a particular network, would attention to and 
the prevalence of a condition be significantly different? We 
can never know for certain, since we cannot rerun history 
and compare outcomes in worlds with and without that 
network. But we can imagine what the world would be like 
without a particular network and make cautious inferences 
on network effects on that basis. Beyond this, we might set 
up matched comparisons that allow us to gain some control 
over alternative explanations for policy and population health 
change. Specifically, we could compare networks matched as 
much as possible on issue characteristics (such as the nature 
of the vector, the ease of transmissibility of the condition and 
its prevalence in high-income countries) and elements of the 
global political context (for instance, whether the condition has 
a dedicated Sustainable Development Goal target—although 
we would need to account for the possibility that the target 
itself is a product of network agency). Doing so offers leverage 
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to assess whether differences in policy and population health 
change across conditions may be due to network activity[2]. 
Another strategy is to consider hard cases where we would not 
expect extensive network influence due to political sensitivities 
or other reasons, such as efforts to liberalize national abortion 
laws. In all these research strategies, investigators are likely 
to benefit by using process-tracing methodologies to detect 
mechanisms of influence.26
As they investigate global health network effects, researchers 
might benefit by drawing on social theory to consider how 
agency and structure are linked. For instance, Giddens’ 
theory of structuration12 recognizes the mutual constitution 
of agency and structure: agents reproduce structure as they 
act. Sewell15 critiques and expands on that theory, identifying 
both ideational and material elements to structure, and the 
power of agency to alter structure. Bourdieu14,27 draws on the 
concepts of agency and structure to develop a theory of social 
worlds—such as law and medicine—organized as fields, 
constituted by actors with shared dispositions but unequal 
positions who deploy various forms of capital to advance 
their interests. Fligstein and McAdam28 expand on Bourdieu’s 
theory of fields to consider not just their stability but also how, 
via individual and collective agency, fields change. Wendt7 
brings social theory into the international relations and global 
governance fields, arguing for theories grounded in the mutual 
constitution of structure and agency—rather than ones that 
have an exclusively structural or individualistic ontological 
foundation. All these theorists offer ways of considering how 
global health networks as agents potentially change the world, 
but do so constrained (and facilitated) by social structures 
and reproducing (and altering) these structures as they act.
Interests and Ideas
Global governance scholars debate not only the power of 
agency, but also the substance of that power. Most scholars 
working in rationalist and Marxist traditions29-31 view power as 
serving interests, derived from control over material resources 
such as financing, the means of production and coercive 
apparatuses. Constructivists point to another form of power: 
ideas, among which are norms—principled beliefs concerning 
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity32—and 
knowledge[3].33 They argue that actors in global governance 
operate not just from a logic of consequences—self-interested 
calculations surrounding means and ends—but also from a 
logic of appropriateness—a sense of right and wrong.34 The 
cross-national spread of women’s suffrage and abolition of 
slavery are two examples of the power of norms.10 
If global health networks influence policy and population 
health, do they do so largely through ideational power, material 
power or an amalgam? Are they motivated by principled 
beliefs, interests, or some combination? While recognizing 
material forces and interests, the original editorial and many 
of the commentaries, consistent with constructivism, ascribe 
power to ideas:
“Research in social psychology and social movement 
scholarship has found that alignment in framing is 
important for persuasion and the adoption of new policies” 
(p. 2).4
“The power of the social construction of issue framing” (p. 
1).6
Some of the commentaries also point to the importance of 
material resources:
“While catalytic funding for some health alliances has 
been forthcoming…there has been no equivalent for other 
NCD-relevant areas such as physical activity or alcohol” 
(p. 3)[4].2 
Like the power of agency, the extent of influence of ideas 
vis-à-vis material forces on global governance outcomes 
is far from settled. One promising avenue for advancing 
inquiry on this subject is an integrative research agenda in 
global governance that challenges the ideational-material 
and norms-interests divides. Sil and Katzenstein,35 for 
instance, call for abandoning paradigm-bound research that 
focuses either on interests or norms, in favor of considering 
multiple perspectives— ‘analytical eclecticism’ in the study of 
international relations. Sell and Prakash36 point out that aside 
from profit, businesses also pursue normative concerns, and 
that non-governmental organizations ((NGOs), presumed 
to be motivated by principle, are concerned with their 
material well-being. Mitchell and Schmitz,37 examining 
transnational NGOs, link norms and resource-maximizing 
behavior through the concept of ‘principled instrumentalism.’ 
Robinson provides evidence that both ideational forces—
the normative influence of NGOs—and material forces—a 
country’s indebtedness to the World Bank—are associated 
with a wave of national adoption of population policies in 
Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s and 1990s.38 Finnemore 
and Sikkink,10 although recognized as constructivists, reject 
the norms-interests division as simplistic, advancing the idea 
that much social change can be understood via processes of 
strategic social construction—actors instrumentally pursuing 
principled concerns to alter social reality. They make a call 
to scholars: “Instead of opposing instrumental rationality and 
social construction we need to find some way to link those 
processes theoretically” (p. 910).
Research on global health networks might benefit from 
attending to this call. Members of global health networks 
may be motivated simultaneously by multiple imperatives10: 
commitment to principled ideas, altruism, the search for 
knowledge, empathy for individuals at risk, the pursuit of 
self-esteem, the desire for the respect of their colleagues, the 
survival of their organizations, the acquisition of authority 
in the field of global health, the undoing of rivals, financial 
gain and geopolitical interest. And their power may be both 
ideational—a function of the potency of their principled ideas 
and epistemic claims—and material—a result of their control 
over financial and other kinds of resources. This complexity 
suggests the value of an interdisciplinary research agenda to 
detect the many potential sources of global health network 
motivation and power, drawing on insights from, among other 
fields, social psychology, organizational behavior, economics, 
sociology, anthropology, history, public administration and 
political science. This complexity also suggests the value 
of drawing on the work of the social theorists mentioned 
above to investigate the mutual constitution of structure and 
agency, and specifically how agents in global health networks 
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construct their fields through their daily practices. Such 
investigations may lead us to challenge mono-causal accounts 
of actor motivation in favor of ones that consider how ideas 
of multiple forms come to constitute interests,10 and how 
ideational and material power are interwoven.15
State and Non-state Actors
A third global governance debate of relevance to the study of 
global health networks pertains to how much power non-state 
actors have in a global system that most analysts consider to 
be state-dominated. Keck and Sikkink39 highlight the power 
to alter state behavior of transnational advocacy networks 
(TANs)—cross-nationally linked networks of mostly non-
state actors pursuing principled concerns such as human 
rights. Haas33 points to the power of epistemic communities—
networks of experts in a particular field such as climate 
change—to do the same[5]. They and other constructivist-
oriented scholars have challenged state-centric paradigms—
particularly neorealism—that take the material capabilities of 
states, in pursuit of self-interested concerns such as security, 
as the only influence on outcomes in the international system 
worth attending to[6].
Several of the commentaries, interpreting global health 
networks to be non-state actors, highlight their power. Marten 
and Smith,3 in a counterpoint commentary on the original 
editorial, argue that states are a prerequisite for global health 
network effectiveness and that studies in the field of global 
health governance have overlooked the role of state power. 
Their points are well-taken, particularly in emphasizing 
the ongoing centrality of the state in the global governance 
system.
However, there are three difficulties with their argument[7]. 
First, they misconstrue global health networks to be exclusively 
non-state actors. Global health networks vary in composition. 
Some are comprised exclusively or predominantly of non-
state actors, such as the Framework Convention Alliance 
for Tobacco Control from which they draw their primary 
examples, and the NCD Alliance, which commentator Dain 
leads. Many others are of mixed composition, linking state 
and non-state actors. For instance, the 1500 partners of the 
Stop TB Partnership include, “international and technical 
organizations, government programs, research and funding 
agencies, foundations, NGOs, civil society and community 
groups and the private sector.”40 In this regard it is worth going 
back to our original definition of global health networks (p. 
2).41 State actors are encompassed in the definition (underlines 
added):
“Global health networks are cross-national webs of 
individuals and organizations linked by a shared concern to 
address a particular health problem global in scope. They 
may consist of and connect multiple types of institutions, 
including United Nations (UN) agencies, bilateral donors, 
international financial institutions, private philanthropic 
foundations, national governments, international and 
national NGOs, medical associations, research institutions 
and think tanks.”
Second, their use of the term ‘prerequisite’ for global health 
network effectiveness denotes a necessary condition, and 
therefore a very strong claim about state power. That claim 
should be investigated, not assumed, and we need to ask about 
effectiveness toward which end. It may be the case that state 
power is necessary for global health network effectiveness on 
nearly all outcomes of interest. However, it is more likely that 
the state’s role in global health network effectiveness varies 
depending on (1) the nature of the issue; (2) the strength and 
composition of the network; (3) the level of the system (ie, 
global, national, sub-national, community); and (4) the stage of 
the policy process (ie, agenda-setting, formulation, adoption, 
implementation, evaluation). In some circumstances, the 
proposition that state power is a prerequisite for global 
health network effectiveness seems plausible: for instance, 
national and sub-national policy implementation where state 
capacity is strong (in areas of limited statehood such as much 
of Somalia, the proposition may not always hold). In other 
circumstances, global health networks—even ones comprised 
predominantly of non-state actors—may have influence even 
in the initial absence of strong state concern: for instance, 
placing a previously overlooked but relatively uncontroversial 
issue, such as newborn survival, on global and national policy 
agendas. The point is that these are open empirical questions 
that require investigation.
Third, it is hard to sustain the claim they make that the thrust 
of global governance scholarship, and more specifically global 
health governance scholarship, has overlooked the role of the 
state—although a more nuanced claim that some works have 
underplayed the role of the state justifiably could be advanced. 
The opposite is more accurate: while there is certainly 
great and growing interest in non-state power, most global 
governance and global health governance scholarship has 
focused on the state, and most researchers working in these 
areas—appropriately in my view, and in line with Marten’s 
and Smith’s central concern—recognize states as the core and 
most powerful actors in the global governance system.
Rather than speak of prerequisites or of overlooking the 
state, there are more promising ways to frame this research 
agenda. One is to take up a valuable suggestion offered by 
Tosun5 to apply to global health the perspective of polycentric 
governance, associated with the work of Elinor Ostrom,42 
often used in climate change research. Ostrom argued that (p. 
552):
“Polycentric systems are characterized by multiple 
governing authorities at differing scales rather than a 
monocentric unit…Each unit within a polycentric system 
exercises considerable independence to make norms and 
rules within a specific domain (such as a family, a firm, 
a local government, a network of local governments, a 
state or province, a region, a national government, or an 
international regime)…. An important lesson is that simply 
recommending a single governance unit to solve global 
collective-action problems—because of global impacts—
needs to be seriously rethought.”
Another idea for framing the research agenda, in line with 
the structure-agency and interest-norm global governance 
debates, is to ask about interconnections. In a global health 
governance system that most analysts appropriately recognize 
as centered on the state, how do states condition the power 
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of non-state actors? How do non-state actors augment or 
challenge the power of the state? What role do state and non-
state actors play jointly in network emergence? In short, in 
what ways are state and non-state power intertwined? 
Global health networks offer rich empirical material to 
explore these questions. Under what circumstances are state 
interests the predominant influence on global health network 
objectives? Non-state interests? When do state and non-state 
preferences converge? How often do coalitions form linking 
state and non-state actors (potentially resulting in competing 
state-non-state alliances)? Under what circumstances are those 
global health networks comprised predominantly of non-
state actors able to hold states to account? When are non-state 
actors the primary force in global health network formation? 
State actors? State-non-state alliances? Via process-tracing, 
historical case studies, matched comparisons, counterfactual 
analysis and other approaches, researchers might gain insights 
concerning the nature, power and effects of global health 
networks, and more broadly on the intersections of state 
and non-state power in the global governance system. And 
again, the social theorists noted above potentially provide 
valuable concepts for understanding these state-non-state 
interactions in the context of global health networks. They 
do so particularly by directing us to consider how historical 
processes and global social structures condition the very 
emergence of global health networks, and how these networks 
in turn, linking state and non-state power, refashion these 
same social structures: the ongoing mutual constitution of 
structure and agency.
Conclusion
The five commentators raise thought-provoking questions 
about the power of global health networks in global health 
governance. Their remarks raise deeper issues pertaining 
to actor power, specifically surrounding the relationships 
between agency and structure, norms and interests and non-
state and state power. Global governance scholars, particularly 
those working in a constructivist tradition, have debated these 
subjects. Some argue that the most promising way to advance 
these debates is to consider ways in which these influences 
are intertwined. I concur and suggest such an integrationist 
research agenda will benefit the study of global health 
networks and global health governance more broadly, while 
also potentially enabling global health research to contribute 
to theory development on the power of agency and normative 
change in the global governance system.
In conclusion I offer three ideas on advancing an integrationist 
research agenda on global health networks—one each 
pertaining to each of the three debates43:
• Mutual constitution of structure and agency: Global 
health networks are products of historical conditions, but 
once created they alter the global health landscapes that 
they join. Global health networks likely reveal processes 
of mutual constitution of structure and agency, rather 
than the power of either structure or agency alone or 
in isolation. It would be valuable for researchers to be 
attentive to these processes of mutual constitution.
• Complex motivations of global health actors: The 
motivations of actors that comprise global health networks 
may be multiple, intertwined and unclear even to the 
actors themselves. In investigating these motivations, 
it may be worth setting aside, at least temporarily, the 
impulse to quickly label these as grounded either in ‘ideas’ 
or ‘interests’ and instead to direct efforts to detecting the 
multiple motivations that may be at work. 
• Fusion of state and non-state power: Many global health 
networks blend state and non-state power. Rather than 
presume the primacy of either, we may gain greater 
insight by exploring just how such power is intertwined.
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Endnotes
[1] Addressing alcohol harm, early childhood development, maternal survival, 
newborn survival, pneumonia, surgical conditions, tobacco control and 
tuberculosis.
[2] We employed this strategy in a project involving six of the eight case studies 
discussed in this editorial (see reference number 41). We compared networks 
addressing tuberculosis and pneumonia—two high-burden communicable 
diseases that predominantly affect the respiratory system; maternal and 
neonatal mortality—problems pertaining to two population groups at risk 
surrounding childbirth; and tobacco use and alcohol harm—two addictive 
substances. In each pair, despite comparable burden, the first has received 
greater global policy attention than the second. The project examined the role 
of networks in explaining this variance.
[3] Some scholars working in Marxist and rationalist traditions also recognize 
ideational power but view such power as advancing interests rather than 
principled beliefs. For instance, Gramsci argues that ruling classes impose 
ideologies on society that reflect their own interests, ensuring cultural hegemony 
in the service of capitalist accumulation, and keeping less powerful classes 
quiescent.
[4] Dain argues that funding is underdeveloped as a factor in our analysis, 
overlooking the fact that it is a central influence in the published conceptual 
framework and analyses from which the four challenges derive (see references 
numbers 25 and 41).
[5] These are not the only kinds of non-state actors that may hold power in the 
global governance system. Others include multinational corporations, private 
philanthropies, terrorist networks and religious institutions.
[6] Not all constructivists emphasize non-state power. Alexander Wendt’s Social 
Theory of International Politics (reference number 8) for instance, is a state-
oriented constructivist account of power in the international system.
[7] A stronger and more defensible perspective on the role of the state in global 
health governance that avoids the first two of these difficulties is articulated 
in Robert Marten (2018): How states exerted power to create the Millennium 
Development Goals and how this shaped the global health agenda: Lessons for 
the sustainable development goals and the future of global health, Global Public 
Health, doi:10.1080/17441692.2018.1468474. 
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